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Abstract: This paper will consider and compare the federal spending
power in three ‘mature’ federations, Australia, Canada and the United
States. One of the issues to be considered will be whether the federal
spending power, as interpreted by the relevant courts, is sufficiently
broad to deal with the obligations of a central government in current
circumstances. In doing so, recurring important issues in fiscal federal-
ism, including the allocation of responsibilities within federal systems
and vertical fiscal imbalance, will be noted. The constitutional context in
which this issue arises, including the fact that the constitution of each of
the countries studied was conceived in times very different from those
we face today, and the fact that the role and size of government has
similarly radically changed since those times, is important. It is argued
that a broad interpretation of the federal government’s spending power
is needed to provide the necessary constitutional flexibility that would
otherwise be forbidden by the formal rigidity of the constitutions and
the difficulty in making amendments, particularly in Australia and
Canada.
Keywords: fiscal federalism, spending power, Pape v Commissioner of
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I. Brief Introduction to Fiscal Federalism
Most federal systems have not been designed for effective inter-
governmental relations1
While this paper is primarily about the federal spending power in
three federal systems, it is also necessary to briefly discuss the ques-
tion of relative regulatory responsibility within federal systems. Of
course, there is a clear relationship between a government’s ability to
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1 Douglas Brown, ‘Aspects of Multilevel Governance in Australia and Canada’, 3,
paper presented to conference ‘Globalisation, Multilevel Governance and
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spend money and a government’s ability to exercise control over par-
ticular functions. This also raises questions about the ability of a
government to raise revenue.
It is generally considered that government functions can be classi-
fied into three components:
• stabilization function—the goals here include economic growth,
full employment and price stability, and the broad tools available
to achieve them include fiscal policy, monetary policy and ex-
change rate policy. It is generally accepted that in a federal
system, this is a function best carried out by the federal
government;
• distribution function—this refers to the need to equitably dis-
tribute income and wealth, typically through progressive taxa-
tion and social welfare spending, including health, education,
housing. Generally, it is again considered that this function
should be performed exclusively by the central government,
because a sub-national government’s attempts to perform this
function may be met by evasive behaviour as capital and labour
move to minimize their taxation obligations;
• allocation function—this refers to actions by government neces-
sary to ensure efficient allocation of resources, including the
provision of public goods, regulatory policies or taxes/subsidies
to correct any market failure; here there is no general consensus
as to which level of government, or both, in a federal system
should have this function.2
In the context of these arguments, other principles are also said to
apply. Briefly, there is the argument of subsidiarity, in other words
that sub-national governments should, subject to efficiency considera-
tions, be responsible for those services whose benefits are confined
primarily to their geographic area and for which residents should
have a choice over both the quantity and quality of service.3 There is
the argument that sub-national governments are better able to dis-
cern tax/service preferences of their residents and to respond appro-
priately, and the argument that competition between sub-national
2 Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (Harcourt Brace: New York, 1972) 4–9; one of
Australia’s leading economists, Neil Warren, summarizes this orthodox position in
his report Benchmarking Australia’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements: Final
Report (NSW Treasury: Sydney, 2006) 5–6.
3 As De Tocqueville put it: ‘in great centralised nations, the legislator is obliged to
give a character of uniformity to the laws which does not always suit the diversity
of customs and of district; as he takes no cognisance of special cases, he can only
proceed upon general principles; and the population are obliged to conform to
the requirements of the laws, since legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies
and the customs of the population, which is a great cause of trouble and misery’:
Democracy in America (Saunders & Otley: London, 1835).
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
14
governments in terms of tax/service delivery leads to better outcomes,
greater policy experimentation, greater choice for citizens etc.4
On the other hand, the argument for sub-national governments in
terms of service delivery (and associated expenditure) is weaker
where expenditure leads to spillover effects in other jurisdictions; the
theory is that the sub-national government will not take these spill-
over effects into account in deciding on the quantity of the service that
it will deliver,5 so left to its own devices it will not decide on the
optimal quantity of those services. Further, some of the beneficiaries
of the service may not pay for the service in terms of taxation, which
is generally not considered optimal. There is also the argument in
terms of economies of scale generated by national rather than sub-
national service delivery, and arguments why in some cases there
should be uniformity in service delivery.6 For example, in respect of
some services, it may be that a minimum level nationwide should
be provided, and the best way to make this happen is arguably
by centralizing delivery of that service. Some research has cast doubt
on whether the subsidiarity principle should be accepted.7 Further
difficulties arise where services are delivered by a combination of
levels of government in terms of blurring of responsibilities, and
one level of government seeking to transfer blame and risk to the
other level of government.8
It has been noted elsewhere that forces of globalization, together
with other factors, have tended to increase the range of issues seen to
be national in character, reducing the range of issues seen as purely
local.9 There is debate at a philosophical level as to which level of
4 Oates, above n.2 at 11–13; Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers, Federalist Paper I:
Australia’s Federal Future, Report (Council for Australian Federation: Canberra,
2007) 9–14; C. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure’ (1956) 64 Journal of
Political Economy 416.
5 G.R. Zodrow and P. Mieszowski, ‘Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation and the
Underprovision of Local Public Goods’ (1986) 19 Journal of Urban Economics 357.
6 Oates, above n. 2 at 32, 53.
7 For example, R.M. Isaac, J.M. Walker and A.W. Williams, ‘Group Size and the
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods’ (1994) 54 Journal of Public Economics 1, and
R.M. Isaac and J.M. Walker, ‘Group Size Effects in Public Good Provision: The
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism’ (1988) 103 Quarterly Journal of Economics
179; H.F. Ladd, ‘An Economic Evaluation of State Limitations on Local Taxing and
Spending Powers’ (1978) 31 National Tax Journal 1; M. Bell and R.C. Fisher, ‘State
Limitations on Local Taxing and Spending Powers: Comment and Re-evaluation’
(1978) 31 National Tax Journal 391; D. Bos, ‘An Optimal Taxation Approach to
Fiscal Federalism—Commentary’ in C.E. McLure (ed.), Tax Assignment in Federal
Countries (Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations: Canberrra, 1983);
Thomas Laubach, Fiscal Relations Across Levels of Government in the United
States (2005) OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 462, 13.
8 Isabelle Joumard and Per Mathis Kongsrud, Fiscal Relations Across Government
Levels (2003) OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 375, 23.
9 As the Business Council of Australia says in its recent report, Reshaping
Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal–State Relations (2006), ‘the
world has changed considerably since federation in 1901. Issues that were once
clearly the responsibility of the states have taken on a more national character.’
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government is better able to undertake particular responsibilities.
Access Economics puts it thus:
Economists prefer the Federal Government to have charge where:
1. The implications of policies ‘spill over’ State borders (for example,
policies affecting the likes of business operations, or long distance
trucking, or water flows);
2. There are big economies of scale and scope with centralising policies
(for example, macroeconomic policymaking, defence, and foreign
affairs);
3. Having State-by-State differences in rules and regulations is a burden
on those who regularly trade across State boundaries (for example, in
regulating banks and companies);
4. There are big differences in capacities across States—for example, if
only one State has huge oil deposits, it makes sense for resource taxes to
lie with the Federal Government rather than with individual State
Governments;
5. Where capital and people can readily move to avoid State-level
policies that affect them. For example, . . . you can’t have only some
States levying death duties, as retirees will move. Similarly, you couldn’t
try to levy taxes on personal or company income or capital gains at the
State level, or have notably different welfare entitlements by State, as
those policy differences would be undermined over time by people mov-
ing. Hence the ideal federal system would promote national markets for
people and for business inputs.10
It is generally considered to be good policy that a government which
spends money has the responsibility of raising it. This argument is
defendable in terms of that government being accountable to the
people for the money it has spent, and that it may have an incentive to
closely monitor its expenditure levels if it is responsible for extracting
it from voters. The phrase ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ (VFI) refers to the
situation where there is a mismatch between expenditure commit-
ments and revenue raising capacity within a federation. Others have
pointed out that, as a general trend, VFI is worsening in those nations
with both central and regional governments; in other words, the mis-
match between spending and expenditure is growing rather than nar-
rowing.11 While the reasons for this mismatch are complex, certainly
one of them is the limited access that sub-national governments enjoy
to certain kinds of tax. There is extensive literature on the kinds of
taxes best levied at one level of government or another; it is often said
that taxes such as income, corporate and value-added taxes are best
10 Access Economics, The Costs of Federalism: Report by Access Economics for the
Business Council of Australia (2006) 14.
11 Joumard and Kongsrud, above n. 8 at 6. This is partly because of the practical
limit on the kinds of taxes that can be levied at sub-national level.
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levied at the national level due to the mobility of the base, while
property taxes are ideally levied at the sub-national level.12
As has been pointed out on many occasions, Australia’s federal
system is characterized by a high degree of VFI.13 According to the
OECD, in Australia state and local governments are responsible for
39.7 per cent of total government spending, yet raise only 17.2 per
cent of the revenue, compared with respective figures in Canada of
58.7 per cent and 44.1 per cent, and the United States of 54 per cent
and 31.7 per cent.14 In other words, of the three federations studied in
this paper, the gap between the amount raised and the amount spent
is, by far, greatest in Australia, and is least in Canada.
Vertical fiscal imbalance is often seen to be problematic, in particu-
lar because governments that aren’t responsible for raising money
may be more careless in how they spend it.15 VFI may blur the lines of
accountability between different levels of government. It may lead
cash-starved levels of government to resort to, or persist with, clearly
inefficient kinds of taxation, leading to market distortions and mis-
allocation of resources.16
12 Ibid. at 23–35; Warren, above n. 2 at 60–2; Laubach, above n. 7 at 23–30. As
Access Economics put it succinctly: ‘globalisation is resulting in a relative increase
in transactions across borders—there is greater mobility among people, business
operations, the sourcing of business inputs and capital. That means there is a
steadily improving case for taxes to be raised at the Federal level—and hence
there is a steadily building case for taking spending responsibilities away from the
States’: above n. 10 at 13.
13 Drummond says that Australia ‘is by far the most centralised First World
federation, and also the most centralised First World democracy’: M. Drummond,
‘Costing Constitutional Change: Estimating the Costs of Five Variations on
Australia’s Federal System’ (2002) 61(4) Australian Journal of Public Administration
43 at 43.
14 OECD Revenue Statistics, various: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook,
various; see also Ronald Watts, Autonomy or Dependence: Intergovernmental
Financial Relations in Eleven Countries (2005) Working Paper 2005(3) IIGR, who
calculated the central government shares of total government revenue and
expenditure. In Australia, the figures were, respectively, 69 per cent and 54 per
cent, in the United States, 67 per cent and 54 per cent, and in Canada, 44 per cent
and 37 per cent: at 51.
15 Jourmard and Kongsrud, above n. 8; Alan Fenna, ‘Commonwealth Fiscal Power
and Australian Federalism’ (2008) 31(2) University of New South Wales Law
Journal 509; Cliff Walsh, ‘The Economics of Federalism and Federal Reform’
(2008) 31(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 553; Cliff Walsh, ‘Vertical
Fiscal Imbalance—The Issues’ in D.J. Collins (ed.), Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and
the Allocation of Taxing Powers, Australian Tax Research Foundation Conference
Series No. 13, 41; Cliff Walsh, ‘Federal Reform and the Politics of VFI’ (1990)
Issues in State Taxation 63; Cheryl Saunders, ‘Fiscal Federalism—A General and
Unholy Scramble’ in Greg Craven (ed.), Australian Federation—Towards the
Second Century (Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 1992).
16 Russel Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal Finance: Intergovernmental Financial
Relations in Australia Since Federation (Thomson Nelson: Australia, 1972) 317–18;
Cliff Walsh, ‘Federal Reform and the Politics of VFI’, above n. 15; Access
Economics, Study on the Distribution of Federal/State Financial Powers (Access
Economics: Australia, 1995) 9; Final Report of the Constitutional Commission
(1988) Vol. 2, para. 11.254–5; see also Gibbs J in Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v
Victoria (1983) 158 CLR 599 at 617.
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VFI has generally become more pronounced in Australia since
federation, as the taxes within the Commonwealth’s control have
grown in importance, and as states have given up certain forms of
taxation. Fenna talks about the ‘natural upward migration of taxing
responsibility, as explained by the theory of fiscal federalism’,17 as well
as the practical constraint on the levying of taxation at sub-national
level due to the mobility of individuals that might be the subject of
such taxation18; in practice this often means that sub-national taxes
are best levied on immobile tax bases. This effectively means that
more of the tax raising responsibility tends to belong at the national
level. As Access Economics put it succinctly:
People and money are becoming more mobile. Because of that, it makes
increasing sense for taxes to be raised at the Federal level – as taxes are
easier to avoid or get competed away at the State level.19
States in Australia have relatively narrow tax bases. Section 90 of the
Constitution prohibits them from levying customs and excise duties;
however all of the revenues from the federally raised goods and ser-
vices tax go to the states. By agreement with the Commonwealth, the
states vacated the income tax field in 1942 and have not returned to it,
though they are legally free to do so, as they would be to levy corpor-
ate tax. They are left with payroll tax and land tax, both of which are
relatively efficient taxes, as well as transactions taxes, which are
highly inefficient taxes, as well as relying to a large extent on federal
government grants.
In contrast, Canadian provinces raise revenue from a broader base
of taxes, including personal income and corporate tax, sales tax, and
property tax. Approximately 60 per cent of their taxation revenue
comes from income and sales tax, with about 10 per cent from payroll
and property tax, and the rest from inefficient taxes.20 States in the
United States rely on income taxation for approximately 39 per cent of
their state tax revenue, with about 33 per cent from sales tax. About
25 per cent is derived from inefficient taxes, with low reliance on
payroll and property tax.21 Approximately one-third of state revenues
is derived from federal government grants.22
Given the record in each federal system studied, and evidence in
other federal systems, of a mismatch between revenue raising and
expenditure commitments, it is natural to ask of any federation
whether one level of government or the other in a federation should
have more or less responsibilities. That is a question for another day.
17 Fenna, above n. 15 at 514.
18 In practice, this often means that sub-national taxes are best levied on immobile
tax bases.
19 Access Economics, above n. 10 at 13: ‘globalisation is resulting in a relative
increase in transactions across borders—there is greater mobility among people,
business operations, the sourcing of business inputs, and capital’.
20 Watts, above n. 14; Warren, above n. 2 at 66.
21 Laubach, above n. 7; Warren, above n. 2 at 67.
22 Warren, above n. 2 at 79.
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The purpose of this paper is narrower; specifically, to investigate what
powers the federal government in each jurisdiction studied has (or
needs) to use this ‘excess money’23 in areas that have not been ex-
pressly assigned to it by the Constitution.
II. The Federal Government’s Spending Power in Each
Jurisdiction Studied
i. Canada
Unlike the other two federations studied, Canadian constitutional
laws do not include an explicit power of the federal government to
spend money. Section 91(3) of the Constitution Act 1867 provides a list
of federal powers, including the raising of money through taxation,
but does not expressly provide for the ability to spend the money.24
There are a range of views as to the source and extent, if any,25 of the
federal government’s spending power. These include that the power is
justified by the royal prerogative and common law,26 or is implicit in
the federal government’s legislative power over public property,27 or
is implicit in the existence of the Consolidated Revenue Fund,28 or
exists because the federal government has in fact exercised the power
for many years,29 or some other reason.30 According to one leading
jurist, the power depends on whether the spending is coercive or
not:
Parliament may spend or lend its funds to any government or institution
or individual it chooses, for any purpose it chooses; and that it may
23 I use the term ‘excess money’ to mean money that the federal government has left
over after it has fulfilled its spending commitments in areas that have been
expressly granted to it by the terms of the Constitution.
24 Nor is there any express reference in the Constitution Act 1982.
25 Some commentators deny the federal government has such a power: see for
example Andree Lajoie, ‘Current Exercises of the “Federal Spending Power”:
What Does the Constitution Say About Them?’ (2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 141;
Andrew Petter, ‘Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power’ (1989)
68 Canadian Bar Review 448; Andrew Petter, ‘The Myth of the Federal Spending
Power Revisited’ (2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 163; Marc-Antoine Adam, ‘The
Spending Power, Co-Operative Federalism and Section 94’ (2008) 34 Queen’s Law
Journal 175.
26 Frank Scott, ‘The Constitutional Background of Taxation Arrangements’ (1955) 2
McGill Law Journal 1.
27 S. 91(1A) Constitution Act 1867.
28 Section 106: E. Dreidger, ‘The Spending Power’ (1981) 7 Queen’s Law Journal 125.
29 Peter Hogg, ‘Analysis of the New Spending Provision (Section 106A)’ in Swinton
and Rogerson (eds), Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech Lake Accord
(Carswell: Toronto, 1988).
30 For example, Hoi Kong argues that s. 36(1) of the Constitution Act 1982, which
allows federal and provincial government action to provide essential public
services to all Canadians, is an alternative source: ‘The Spending Power,
Constitutional Interpretation and Legal Pragmatism’ (2008) 33 Queen’s Law
Journal 305.
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attach to any grant or loan any condition it chooses, including condi-
tions it could not directly legislate. There is a distinction, in my view,
between compulsory regulation, which can obviously be accomplished
only by legislation enacted within the limits of legislative power, and
spending or lending or contracting, which either imposes no obligations
on the recipient . . . or obligations which are voluntarily assumed by the
recipient . . . There is no compelling reason to confine spending or lend-
ing or contracting within the limits of legislative power, because in those
functions the government is not purporting to exercise any peculiarly
governmental authority over its subjects.31
In an early decision, the Privy Council appeared to suggest limits on
the ability of the federal government to spend:
That the Dominion may impose for the purpose of creating a fund for
special purposes and may apply that fund for making contributions to
the public interest to individuals, corporations or public authorities
could not as a general proposition be denied . . . But assuming that the
Dominion has collected by means of taxation a fund, it by no means
follows that any legislation which disposes of it is necessarily within
Dominion competence.32
Not surprisingly, at a similar time Lord Atkin in the Privy Council
described Canada’s federal system in terms of ‘watertight compart-
ments’. As he put it, ‘while the ship of state now sails on larger
ventures . . . she still retains the watertight compartments which are
essential to her original structure’.33
Despite these comments, in subsequent cases there have not been
suggestions of limits on the spending power of the federal govern-
ment. For example, in Winterhaven Stables Ltd v Canada (AG),34 the
Alberta Court of Appeal validated provisions of federal income tax
legislation which included provisions transferring money from the
federal government to provinces for spending in areas falling within
exclusive province control. In comments in several Supreme Court
31 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Carswell: Toronto, 2007) 6.18–6.19. One
of the cases Professor Hogg uses in justification is the Reference Re Canada
Assistance Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525, a decision he views as ‘clear affirmation of
both of the Parliament’s power to authorize grants to the provinces for use in
fields of provincial jurisdiction and the power to impose conditions on the
recipient provinces. Provided Parliament’s intervention does not go beyond the
granting or withholding of money, there is no unconstitutional trespass on
provincial jurisdiction’ (175–6).
32 Reference Re Employment and Social Insurance Act (Can) [1937] 1 DLR 684, PC
(Unemployment Insurance Reference); see also Lord Watson in Liquidators of
Maritime Bank v Receiver General of New Brunswick [1892] AC 437, PC, and Lord
Haldane in Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co v R [1916] 1 AC 566 at 580, PC.
33 Reference Re Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, Minimum Wages Act and
Limitation of Hours of Work Act [1937] 1 DLR 673 at 684, PC. Hoi Kong argues
that Lord Atkin’s watertight theory of federalism has been overtaken by
developments in doctrine and practice: above n. 30 at 312.
34 [1988] 91 AR 114.
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decisions, judges have, admittedly in obiter comments, expressed a
broad view of the federal spending power.35
ii. Australia
There is not and never has been a rational basis for the federal spending
power in Australia.36
Section 81 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides the federal
government with a power to make appropriations of money ‘for the
purposes of the Commonwealth’. This section is complemented by a
power in s. 96 to make conditional grants to states.37 Section 81 has
proven contentious, with different views expressed as to the meaning
of the above phrase. Some judges have taken what might be called a
‘narrow view’, in other words that this phrase means areas over
35 For example, in YMHA Jewish Community Centre of Winnipeg v Brown [1989] 1
SCR 1532, L’Heureux-Dube J, speaking for the court, concluded: ‘However, while
Parliament may be free to offer grants subject to whatever restrictions it sees fit,
the decision to make a grant of money in any particular area should not be
construed as an intention to regulate all related aspects of that area’ (at 1533).
Sopinka J in Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525,
appeared to assume the existence of a federal spending power in areas of
provincial jurisdiction: ‘The written argument of the Attorney General of
Manitoba was that the legislation “amounts to” regulation of a matter outside of
federal authority. I disagree. The Agreement under the plan set up an open-ended
cost sharing scheme, which left it to British Columbia to decide which
programmes it would establish and fund. The simple withholding of federal
money which had previously been granted to fund a matter within provincial
jurisdiction does not amount to regulation of that matter’ (at 567). La Forest J in
Eldridge v British Columbia (AG) [1997] 3 SCR 624, suggested that the spending
power had been constitutionalized (para. 25): ‘(The constitutionality of this kind of
conditional grant [from the federal government made to fund provincial health
insurance programmes] was approved by this court in Reference Re Canada
Assistance Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525, 567).’ The existence of the power was also
assumed in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (AG) [2004] 3 SCR 657
at 682 (‘the federal government, however, has authority under its spending power
to attach conditions to financial grants to the provinces that are used to pay for
social programs’), and in Chaoulli v Quebec (AG) [2005] 1 SCR 791, para. 16:
‘Although the federal government has express jurisdiction over certain matters
relating to health … it is in practice that it imposes its views on the provincial
governments in the health care sphere by means of its spending power’. The
Supreme Court most recently declined to consider the issue in Syndicat National
des Employes de ‘aluminium d’Arvida Inc v Canada (AG) (Supreme Court of
Canada, 11 December 2008).
36 Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Development of the Commonwealth Spending Power’
(1978) 11 Melbourne University Law Review 369 at 407.
37 Cheryl Saunders makes the point that ‘the federal spending power has developed
differently in Australia from Canada or the United States primarily as a result of
the presence of section 96 of the Constitution’: above n. 36 at 374. In her article
she also discusses the interrelation between the two sections. The High Court of
Australia has never invalidated a s. 96 grant, usually on the basis that the states
are legally free to accept or not accept the grant, and the fact they might have a
large financial inducement to accept the conditions attached to the grant does not
amount to unacceptable coercion: South v Australia (1942) 65 CLR 373; Victoria v
Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575. In the consideration of questions of coercion,
practical or legal, there is some overlap between the Australian and American
jurisprudence.
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which the federal government has been given legislative power, pri-
marily by s. 51 of the Constitution.38 Other judges have taken a
broader view, in essence that the Commonwealth can appropriate
funds for whatever purposes it wishes.39 A recent example of this is
Gleeson CJ (as he then was) in Combet v The Commonwealth: ‘It is for
the Parliament, in making appropriations, to determine what pur-
poses are purposes of the Commonwealth.’40
Yet other judges have taken what might be considered an inter-
mediate view, that the scope of the power is not limited to purposes
for which the Commonwealth has express legislative power, but
might include things that are appropriate targets of spending by a
national government,41 however this is described or determined.42
38 Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, per Williams J (at
282); Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338, per Gibbs J (at
373). There is some support for this position from a reading of the Convention
Debates: Saunders, above n. 36 at 375–9. She concludes that ‘although there was
some uncertainty in the debates over the effect of s. 81 in either its original or
final form, it seems unlikely on balance that it was intended to allow
appropriation for any purpose’ (at 377).
39 Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, per Latham CJ (at
253–4) and McTiernan J (at 274); Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134
CLR 338, per McTiernan J (at 369) Mason J (at 395–7) and Murphy J (at 417). Sir
Robert Garran, in evidence given to the 1929 Royal Commission on the
Constitution, said he had always considered that s. 81 was an ‘absolute power of
appropriation’, an assumption upon which the Commonwealth had relied (Report
of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1929), 140). Similarly, the
Constitutional Commission in its 1988 Report noted the practice whereby federal
Parliament had made appropriations to persons or bodies for purposes not
apparently connected with the purposes of the Commonwealth: Final Report of
the Constitutional Commission (1988), vol. 2, 834. Sir Robert contrasted the phrase
used in s. 81 with that used in the compulsory acquisition provision, s. 51(31), ‘any
purpose in respect of which the Parliament had power to make laws’ (which has
been interpreted to require another head of power pursuant to which the
acquisition takes place). There is also some support for the broad view in the
Convention Debates: Saunders, above n. 36 at 375–9.
40 (2005) 224 CLR 494 at 522. One justification for such a view is that appropriations
often contain very little detail, limiting the ability of the court, even if it wished to,
to scrutinize the purposes of the appropriation for constitutional reasons. As
Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ point out in Combet v The
Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, the appropriation commonly only specifies an
amount that may be spent rather than further define the purposes or activities for
which it may be spent (at 577).
41 Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, per Starke J (at 266)
who would allow the Commonwealth to spend on executive matters and ‘matters
arising from the existence of the Commonwealth and its status as a Federal
Government’, and Dixon J (with whom Rich J agreed (at 264)) who would allow
the Commonwealth to spend on matters ‘incidental to the existence of the
Commonwealth as a state and to the exercise of the functions of a national
government . . . these are things which . . . should be interpreted widely’ (at 269);
see also Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338, per Barwick
CJ (at 362) matters ‘inherent in the fact of nationhood and of international
personality’ and/or matters ‘within the executive power’; Mason J (at 397) and
Jacobs J (at 412) to like effect.
42 This may be on the basis of the s. 61 executive power, s. 51(39) (incidental power)
or an inherent nationhood power: see for example Mason J in Victoria v
Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338 at 397: ‘capacity to engage in
enterprises and activities peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation and
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This position reflects a distinction being made between the heads of
power relevant to the question of whether legislative regulation is
valid, and questions of the validity of an appropriation under s. 81.
Specifically, on this view the Commonwealth may not need to point to
a head of power other than s. 8143 in order to spend money; but any
regulation of the subject matter would require a source in one of the
Commonwealth’s other heads of power, primarily located in s. 51 but
also importantly in this context, s. 61. Issues have also been raised as
to the justiciability of the question of the validity of an appropriation,44
again an issue quite separate from the question of the validity of any
regulation of the subject matter.45
The High Court recently re-considered its views on these issues in
Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.46 That case concerned the
validity of the federal government’s response to the ‘global financial
crisis’; this response included the payment of $900 to various tax-
payers, in an effort to stimulate the economy and deal with the ‘crisis’.
A majority of the court (Heydon J dissenting) validated the measures.
The case raised various issues, most particularly here the interpreta-
tion to be given to the s. 81 appropriations provision and the s. 61
executive power.
French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ concluded that s. 81
reflected established principles of responsible government, including
the need for proposed expenditure to be approved by Parliament.47 It
was not a source of substantive power to the Commonwealth48; it
contained words of limitation rather than words of empowerment.49
They denied that the Commonwealth could, pursuant to s. 81, spend
which cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the nation’; see also
Jacobs J (at 412); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79 at 93 (Mason CJ,
Deane and Gaudron JJ), and Brennan J (at 111). In Davis Wilson and Dawson JJ
agreed the Commonwealth had power under s. 61 to act consistent with its
character and status as a national government (at 104), as did Toohey J (at 119).
43 In phrasing it in this way, I must acknowledge that the most recent statements of
the High Court in Pape are to the effect that s. 81 is not a substantive head of
power.
44 Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338 at 387 (Stephen J),
Mason J (at 394), Jacobs J (at 410), Murphy J (at 424); Davis v Commonwealth
(1988) 166 CLR 79 at 96 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ) and at 110 (Brennan
J); Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 83 ALJR 765 at 828 (Hayne and
Keifel JJ). Sir Robert Garran argued that appropriations were not justiciable
unless ‘the purpose was one which could, by no conceivable means, have any
interest for the Commonwealth qua Commonwealth’: Garran, above n. 39 at 138.
45 However, in Pape, Hayne and Keifel JJ rejected the distinction between spending
and engagement in activities (at 833).
46 (2009) 83 ALJR 765. The case is discussed in detail by Cheryl Saunders in ‘The
Source and Scope of Commonwealth Power to Spend’ (2009) 20 Public Law
Review 256.
47 (2009) 83 ALJR 765 at 786 (French CJ), 804 (French CJ), 804, 807 (Gummow,
Crennan and Bell JJ); see also Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134
CLR 338 at 385–6 (Stephen J). This point is discussed further in Enid Campbell,
‘Parliamentary Appropriations’ (1972) 4 Adelaide Law Review 145.
48 (2009) 83 ALJR 765 at 787.
49 Ibid. at 787.
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on whatever subject matter it wished.50 The phrase ‘purposes of the
Commonwealth’ meant purposes otherwise authorized by the Con-
stitution or statutes made under it.51 It was not confined to legislative
power. Here, s. 61 was the relevant head of power which validated the
appropriations.52 The majority accepted formulations of the s. 61
power in earlier cases that it conferred on the Executive power to
engage in activities and enterprises peculiarly adapted to the govern-
ment of a nation and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the
nation’s benefit.53 This was the ambit also of the spending aspect of
the s. 61 power. It was a valid exercise of s. 61 to spend money to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis, and the
expenditure was of a scale and required timeframe that it was pecu-
liarly within the capacity of the national government.54 The court re-
iterated that the Executive could not act under s. 61 merely because it
believed that a matter was of national interest and concern.55
One difficulty in expressing the ambit of the Commonwealth’s
spending power in this way is that it creates uncertainty. As one
specific example, judges will differ, and have differed, in their view on
the question of whether welfare spending, a sizeable proportion of the
Commonwealth of Australia’s appropriations each year, fits the above
description. This issue divided the High Court in Victoria v Com-
monwealth,56 where Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Mason JJ, in dissent, did
not agree that the Australian Assistance Plan, a Commonwealth wel-
fare scheme, met the above description of a scheme that could only be
50 Ibid. at 807 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell); Hayne and Keifel JJ left open the
question of whether ‘purposes of the Commonwealth’ meant any purpose
determined by the Commonwealth (at 822).
51 Ibid. at 794. French CJ left open whether matters within the description of
‘national concern’ or ‘national emergency’ could enliven the s. 61 power (at 775);
while Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ claimed the Commonwealth could not rely
on s. 61 to pass laws on any subject which the executive government regarded as
being of national interest or concern (at 813); French CJ denied the executive
power was to be equated with a general power to manage the national economy
(at 798), as did Hayne and Keifel JJ (at 836). As indicated above, Hayne and Keifel
JJ left open whether ‘purposes of the Commonwealth’ meant any purpose
determined by the Commonwealth (at 822). They acknowledged that the phrase
did not readily provide a criterion by which the validity of an appropriation could
be determined (at 827), and that appropriations are ordinarily expressed with
great generality, making it difficult in practice to apply a test based on the words
(at 828).
52 Ibid. at 794.
53 Ibid., French CJ (at 798), Gummow, Crennan Bell JJ (at 813); in Vadarlis, French J
(as he then was) spoke of s. 61 validating a law ‘central to the expression of
Australia’s status and sovereignty as a nation’: (2001) 110 FCR 491 at 542.
54 (2009) 83 ALJR 765 at 774 (French CJ), 814 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ);
George Winterton criticized this test as it appeared in Victoria v Commonwealth
and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338 thus: ‘the criteria of being “peculiarly adapted to
the government of a nation” and being “unable otherwise to be carried on for the
benefit of the nation” are political questions unsuited to judicial determination’:
‘The Limits and Use of Executive Power by Government’ (2003) 31 Federal Law
Review 421 at 427.
55 (2009) 83 ALJR 765 at 813 (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).
56 Australian Assistance Plan Case (1975) 134 CLR 338.
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carried out by a national government.57 Of the majority judges who
upheld the legislation, much of the reasoning was on the basis that an
appropriation was not justiciable; however, Jacobs J alluded to the
broad scope of the appropriations power:
The purposes of the Commonwealth [within s. 81] may not only fall
within a subject matter of general or particular power prescribed in the
Constitution but may also be other purposes which now adhere fully to
Australia as a nation externally and internally sovereign. The growth of
national identity results in a corresponding growth in the area of activ-
ities which have an Australian rather than a local flavour. Thus, the
complexity and values of a modern society result in a need for co-
ordination and integration of ways and means of planning for that
complexity and reflecting those values. Inquiries of a national scale are
necessary and likewise planning on a national scale must be carried out.
Moreover, the complexity of society, with its various interrelated needs,
requires co-ordination of services designed to meet those needs. Re-
search and exploration likewise have a national, rather than a local,
flavour . . . The Australian Assistance Plan is an expenditure of money in
the exercise by the Commonwealth of its executive power to formulate
and co-ordinate plans and purposes which require national rather than
local planning and of its legislative power to appropriate funds accord-
ingly . . . It is (also) an expenditure of money which is incidental to the
execution by the Commonwealth of its wide powers respecting social
welfare.58
Further, such a test increases the likelihood that a federal appropri-
ation will be challenged on the basis that it is not within a head of
power in s. 51, s. 61 or elsewhere. Such an outcome has been criti-
cized by previous members of the High Court. For example, Murphy J
in Victoria v Commonwealth claimed:
To ascertain whether these appropriations are referable to one of the
enumerated powers [other than s. 81] would involve exhaustive inquiry
into the boundaries of the enumerated powers. The appropriation for
those purposes not within the scope of the enumerated powers would,
on the plaintiff’s contention, be unconstitutional. Hundreds of items of
appropriation since federation and many hundreds of millions of dollars
would have been unlawfully appropriated and spent. The chilling effect
that such an interpretation would have on governmental and parlia-
mentary initiatives is obvious. It is one for stultifying government.59
57 Ibid. at 363 (Barwick CJ), 379 (Gibbs J) (on the basis that the s. 61 power was
limited to executive matters within the legislative competence of the
Commonwealth) and 401 (Mason J). French J (as he then was) took a broader
view of the s. 61 power in Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 at 542. There is also debate
as to whether the s. 61 power is limited to cases involving the exercise of the
Crown prerogative; this is favoured by Winterton but cases such as Davis suggest
the power is broader: above n. 54 at 425–33.
58 (1975) 134 CLR 338 at 412–13.
59 Ibid. at 418.
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In the same case, Mason J stated:
It is not lightly to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution
intended to circumscribe the process of parliamentary appropriation by
the constraints of constitutional power and thereby to expose the items
in an Appropriation Act to judicial scrutiny and declarations of invalid-
ity. Consequences more detrimental and prejudicial to the process of
Parliament would be difficult to conceive. Any item in the Act would be
subject to a declaration of invalidity after the Act is passed, even after
the moneys in question are withdrawn from Consolidated Revenue and
perhaps even after the moneys are expended, for an appropriation, if it
be unlawful and subject to a declaration of invalidity, does not cease to
have that character because acts have taken place on the faith of it.60
Mason J noted the practice in many jurisdictions to provide a short
description of the particular items to be dealt with in an Appropri-
ation Act. In many cases, this was because the items of expenditure
had not been thought through at this point. Practically, it was im-
possible that this short description could now be used as a basis for
testing the constitutionality of an appropriation, yet that is what
would occur if an appropriation needed to be supported by a head of
power outside s. 81 itself.61
iii. United States
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with power
to ‘lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States’. In relation to what the Article says about Congress’s
ability to appropriate (spend) money, two main views have competed
for attention: (a) the narrow view, that the power of appropriation is
limited to the purposes for which Congress has express legislative
power elsewhere in the Constitution62; and (b) the broad view, that the
Article is a grant of power to spend for purposes not necessarily
expressly provided for in the Constitution.63
60 Ibid. at 394.
61 Ibid.
62 This is often referred to as the ‘Madison view’, a view supported by Thomas
Jefferson.
63 This is often referred to as the ‘Hamilton view’: ‘it is therefore, of necessity, left to
the discretion of the National Legislature to pronounce upon the objects which
concern the general welfare and for which, under that description, an
appropriation of money is requisite and proper’: Alexander Hamilton, Report on
Manufactures to the House of Representatives (5 December 1791), reprinted in 4
The Works of Alexander Hamilton (1885) 70–198. This was a view that Joseph
Story also supported: ‘If it [the debts and general welfare clause] is a mere
appendage or qualification of the power to lay taxes, still it involves a power of
general appropriation of the moneys so raised, which indirectly produces the
same result’: Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 5th edn
(Little, Brown: Boston, 1891), s. 920, and at s. 727, ‘appropriations have never
been limited by Congress to cases falling within the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution, whether those powers be construed in their broad or narrow
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The first major case considering the clause was United States v
Butler.64 There proceeds of a tax on agricultural processors was used
to subsidize farmers who agreed to take land out of production. The
federal government had designed the programme to reduce food
production, hoping that a diminished supply would stimulate the
price of agricultural products. It argued that the Act was justified
under Article 1, section 8.
The Supreme Court found, confusingly, that Congress’s power to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes was not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power in the Constitution.
However, the plan was unconstitutional, because it involved practical
(though not legal) coercion of farmers to cease or reduce production,
which was impermissible. Congress could not tax for purposes within
the exclusive province of the states.
Apparently similar questions were answered differently in the 1937
decision of Steward Machine Co v Davis. Congress’s Social Security
Act established a national social security system funded by a tax on
employers with eight or more staff, allowing employers to deduct
most of their contribution to qualifying state unemployment plans.
The aim of this provision was to accommodate states with existing
social security programmes, and encourage others to establish pro-
grammes. Qualifying state unemployment plans were those where the
states deposited all moneys collected into a federal fund. The federal
government would then assist the state in administering its plan for
the unemployed. Steward unsuccessfully challenged the legislation.
The court agreed that Congress could not use its spending power
to coerce the states into participating in federal programmes; to do so
would destroy the autonomy of the states and upset the balance of
powers between the federal government and state governments.
While at some point the court noted pressure could turn into compul-
sion,65 on the facts there was no inducement; states could abstain if
they wished. The court accepted a coercion test based on legalities
rather than practicalities.66 Since this decision, the authority of
Congress to spend money on whatever it wishes has largely gone
sense’. Note that this power in the United States includes the power to make
grants to states, a power specifically given to the federal government in Australia
in a separate section of the Constitution (s. 96) to the appropriations power (s. 81):
Saunders, above n. 36 at 374.
64 (1936) 297 US 1.
65 Steward Machine Co v Davis 301 US 548, 590 (1937).
66 As Cardozo J put it: ‘every rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in
some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to
coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties. The outcome of such a
doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice
becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a robust common sense
which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in solution to its
problems’ (589–90). The court distinguished Butler on its facts.
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unchallenged.67 This broad view of Congress’s spending power has,
not surprisingly, been both endorsed68 and criticized69 by
commentators.
The court has applied this test of coercion in subsequent cases. For
example, in South Dakota v Dole,70 the challenged legislation involved
a federal statutory provision authorizing the withholding of 5 per cent
of highway funds from any state not raising its drinking age to 21. The
federal government was seeking greater uniformity in the drinking
age across America and a higher age than was the case in many states
in order to tackle road accident numbers. South Dakota argued the
provision usurped state power to regulate alcohol, a power reserved
to the states by the 21st Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected the
challenge on the basis that the provision did not directly regulate
states’ drinking ages; it merely encouraged states to raise their drink-
ing ages.71 Chief Justice Rehnquist, not a noted centralist, concluded
that ‘objectives not thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legis-
lative fields . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds’.72 The
effect of this decision was that Congress could use the spending
power not only to exercise rights not expressly granted to it by the
Constitution, but could also exercise powers specifically denied to
them.73
Other possible limits that have been suggested on the ability of
Congress to spend pursuant to section 8 include that the measures not
67 For example, in Helvering v Davis the court agreed that questions could remain as
to what was within the ‘general welfare’ and what was not, but that these were
questions for Congress: 301 US 619 at 644 (1937). As Justice Holmes put it in
Hammer v Dagenhart 247 US 251 at 281 (1918): ‘it seems to me entirely
constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding [of good policy about
anything] by all the means at its command’.
68 Reeve Bull, ‘The Virtue of Vagueness: A Defense of South Dakota v Dole’ (2006) 56
Duke Law Journal 279; Neil Siegel, ‘Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis’ (2008) 16
Supreme Court Economic Review 165; Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Protecting the
Spending Power’ (2001) 4 Chapman Law Review 89; Samuel Bagenstos, ‘Spending
Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court’ (2008) 58 Duke Law Journal 345.
69 See for example Celestine Richards McConville, ‘Federal Funding Conditions:
Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes’ (2001) 4 Chapman Law Review 163; Lynn
Baker, ‘Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez’ (1995) 95 Columbia Law
Review 1911 and ‘The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival’ (2001) 4
Chapman Law Review 195.
70 (1987) 483 US 203.
71 Ibid. at 210–11; see also New York v United States (1992) 505 US 144; Kansas v
United States 214 F. 3d 1196 (10th Cir, 2000), cert. denied 1231 S Ct. 623 (2000);
Rumsfeld v FAIR 547 US 47 at 59–60 (2006).
72 (1987) 483 US 203 at 207; he made the same comment in Rust v Sullivan 500 US
173 at 193 (1991): ‘the Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest’, although they are not within the federal government’s legislative
power to control. The Dole approach was applied recently in Pierce County v
Guillen 537 US 129 (2003).
73 Jeffrey Benz, ‘What Spending Clause? An Examination of the Views of Hamilton,
Madison and Story on Article 1 Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution’ (2000) 33 John Marshall Law Review 81 at 85.
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impact on essential state government functions, and there be some
kind of ‘germaneness’ or relation between the conditions imposed on
any spending, i.e. that they bear some relation to the purpose of the
spending. In the first case, this limit has been discarded74; in the
second case, the limit remains, but has been rarely applied to strike
down spending.75
Part of the Court’s deference to Congress in its judgment of what is
for the ‘general welfare’ of the country is explained by Bagenstos
thus:
Any doctrine that would put the courts in the position of second-
guessing Congress’s determination of what is in the ‘general welfare’
will necessarily raise the concern that the courts are repeating what is
understood to be the mistake of Lochner v New York—the judicial arro-
gation of authority to decide whether legislation is in face in the general
interest.76
III. Forces Within Federal Systems
i. Requirements of the Nation Change from the Original Division
of Powers
It is trite to observe that since the Constitutions of the countries
studied were formulated, very significant changes have occurred in
the economy, society and culture of those nations. All documents are
products of their time; constitutions are no different. Certainly, at the
time the original Canadian Constitution was written and at the time
the Australian Constitution was written, liberalism was the dominant
ideology. Liberalism is a strong theme in some of the early twentieth-
century decisions of the United States Supreme Court.77 The concep-
tion of the role of government was vastly different from what is
expected today in a modern welfare state.78
74 The limit was first suggested (in the context of a federal Act imposing minimum
wage and maximum hour controls, rather than federal spending) in National
League of Cities v Usery (1976) 426 US 833, but this approach was discarded in
Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) 469 US 528.
75 A rare example is Frost and Frost Trucking Co v Railroad Commission (1926) 271
US 583, where the court found to be coercive (and invalid) a state law
conditioning use of roads on acceptance of common carrier liability. David
Engdahl in ‘The Spending Power’ (1994) 44 Duke Law Journal 1 at 56, claims the
‘apothecaries of germaneness have too little science to devise a medicine that
could work. The germaneness “cure” they peddle amounts to no more than cheap
whiskey and snake oil’; see also David Engdahl, ‘The Contract Thesis of the
Federal Spending Power’ (2007) 52 South Dakota Law Review 496.
76 Bagenstos, above n. 68 at 357.
77 A classic example is Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905).
78 Roderick Macdonald, ‘The Political Economy of the Federal Spending Power’
(2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 249 notes ‘the 19th century conception of the role
of government, and the consequent allocation of responsibility as between
provincial legislatures and the Parliament of Canada in 1867, proved ill-adjusted
to the needs of 20th century states’. Sujit Choudhry makes the same point;
interestingly he contrasts constitutions drafted in the nineteenth century with the
1996 South African Constitution, including its express provision for the welfare
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Indeed, it is part of the genius of the documents that they have
endured as long as they have, written in and for very different times
from the times of today. Writing back in 1950, James Buchanan ob-
served these changes, and the difficulties they posed for federal
finance:
The emerging fiscal problem has been only one of the many created by
the progressive national integration of the economic system within a
decentralised political structure.79
As Windeyer J put it:
The colonies which in 1901 became States in the new Commonwealth
were not before then sovereign bodies in any strict legal sense; and
certainly the Constitution did not make them so. They were self-
governing colonies which, when the Commonwealth came into exist-
ence as a new Dominion of the Crown, lost some of their former powers
and gained no new powers. They became components of a federation,
the Commonwealth of Australia. It became a nation. Its nationhood was
in the course of time to be consolidated by war, by economic and com-
mercial integration, by the unifying influence of federal law, by the
decline of dependence upon British naval and military power and by a
recognition and acceptance of external interests and obligations. With
these developments the position of the Commonwealth, the federal
government, has waxed; and that of the States has waned. In law that is
a result of the paramount position of the Commonwealth Parliament in
matters of concurrent power. And this legal supremacy has been re-
inforced in fact by financial dominance. That the Commonwealth would,
as time went on, enter progressively, directly or indirectly, into fields
that had been formerly been occupied by the States was from an early
date seen as likely to occur.80
This passage was expressly adopted in the joint reasons of the High
Court in the recent decision New South Wales v Commonwealth,81
where the court emphatically rejected an argument that the Austra-
lian Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the views
of the founding fathers. As the joint reasons put it: ‘to pursue the
identification of what is said to be the framers’ intention, much more
often than not, is to pursue a mirage’.82 Further, in the 2008 Betfair
decision,83 six members of the High Court agreed with the comment
of O’Connor J in 1908 that ‘it must always be remembered that we are
state, health care, social assistance, housing and economic development. He
concludes that ‘this comparison between a constitution negotiated in the mid-19th
century and one negotiated at the end of the 20th century highlights the
enormous gap between what we need our constitution to do and what its written
text says’: ‘Constitutional Change in the 21st Century: A New Debate Over the
Spending Power’ (2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 375 at 379.
79 James Buchanan, ‘Federalism and Fiscal Equity’ (1950) American Economic
Review 583 at 585.
80 Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353 at 395–6.
81 (2006) 229 CLR 1 at 73 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
82 Ibid. at 97.
83 Betfair Pty Ltd v WA (2008) 234 CLR 418.
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interpreting a Constitution broad and general in its terms, intended to
apply to the varying conditions which the development of our com-
munity must involve’.84
This is similar to the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme
Court, which has recently placed on record that it ‘takes a progressive
approach to ensure that Confederation can be adapted to new social
realities’.85 It is similar to the broad approach taken by the United
States Supreme Court. A prime example is the joint reasons in New
York v United States:86
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the
Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct
such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have
believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would
assume such responsibilities . . . the volume of interstate commerce and
the range of commonly accepted objects of government regulation have
. . . expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory
authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate
commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely
local have come to have effects on the national economy, and have
accordingly come within the scope of Congress’s commerce power . . .
As conventional notions of the proper objects of government spending
have changed over the years, so has the ability of Congress to fix the
terms upon which it shall disburse federal money to the States.87
This trend is certainly not confined to the jurisdictions studied in this
paper. Writing of global federalism trends, Hueglin and Fenna noted
recently:
Changing circumstances have meant that the original intentions of
founders of federations may not fit with a modern economy because the
classic legislative federations were established in an altogether different
era when the size and scope of government were limited, and it was
relatively easy to divide responsibilities and to imagine two levels of
government operating in their own spheres with little clash or overlap
. . . The mixed economy, the welfare state, the rise of environmental
policy, and the enormous increase in taxation have all greatly compli-
cated policy making in a system of divided jurisdiction—as have the
84 Ibid. at 453 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Crennan and Keifel JJ);
O’Connor J’s words appeared in Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners
Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 at 367–8.
85 Re Employment Insurance Act 2005 [2005] 2 SCR 669 (Deschamps J for a
unanimous court); see also Same Sex Marriage Reference 2004 [2004] 3 SCR 698,
again a unanimous decision.
86 505 US 144 (1992).
87 Ibid. at 156–7 (Rehnquist CJ, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas JJ);
see also Prudential Insurance Co v Benjamin, Insurance Commissioner 328 US 408
(1946): ‘physical and economic change in the way commerce is carried on has
called forth a constantly increasing volume of legislation exercising that
(commerce) power’ (at 413) (Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge
and Burton JJ; Jackson J took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case).
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vastly greater mobility of labour, geographical scope of economic activ-
ity, and quality of communication and transportation.88
This mirrors comments by other eminent jurists, from Australia,89 the
United States,90 Canada,91 and the Privy Council92 that denounces an
88 T.O. Hueglin and A. Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry
(Broadview Press: Toronto, 2006) 315; per Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg
JJ in United States v Morrison (2000) 529 US 598: ‘we live in a nation knit together
by two centuries of scientific, technical, commercial and environmental change’.
89 Sir Owen Dixon: ‘it is a Constitution we are interpreting, an instrument of
government meant to endure and conferring powers expressed in general
propositions wide enough to be capable of flexible application to changing
circumstances’ (Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71
CLR 29 at 81; see also Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182
CLR 104 at 171 per Deane J, denying the suggestion that the ‘dead hands’ of those
who framed the Constitution could reach from their graves to negate or constrict
natural implications of the Constitution to deprive what was intended to be a
living instrument of its adaptability and ability to serve future generations. There
is a significant academic debate—see G. Hill, ‘Originalist vs Progressivist
Interpretations of the Constitution’ (2000) 11 Public Law Review 159; Michael
Kirby, ‘Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor
Worship?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 1; Cheryl Saunders,
‘Interpreting the Constitution’ (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289; Michael Stokes,
‘Interpretation and Change in Constitutional Law: A Reply to Jeffrey
Goldsworthy’ (1996) 21 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1; Sir Owen Dixon,
‘The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation’ (1957) 31 Australian
Law Journal 240; Gonzalo Villalta Puig, The High Court of Australia and Section 92
of the Commonwealth Constitution (Thomson Lawbook, Sydney, 2008) 123–5. As
Graham Hart put it: ‘it must often be found that a meaning of a basic document
such as a constitution which conforms to the legal economic and political ideas of
one generation by no means does so to those of another. No society is ever static
and one that does not respond to each new challenge must perish. The problems
can only be solved by giving effect to the language used, but we must expect each
new generation to give a new effect’: ‘Some Aspects of Section 92 of the
Constitution’ (1957) 30 Australian Law Journal 551 at 561.
90 Chief Justice John Marshall: ‘we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs’: McCullough v Maryland 4 Wheat
316 at 407, 415 (1819); Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr: ‘the case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what
was said a hundred years ago’: Missouri v Holland 252 US 416 at 423 (1920).
91 Lord Sankey referred to the Canadian Constitution as a ‘living tree capable of
growth and expansion within its natural limits’: Edwards v A-G Can [1930] AC 124
at 136; Peter Hogg: ‘the idea underlying the doctrine of progressive interpretation
is that the Constitution Act 1867, although undeniably a statute, is not a statute
like any other: it is a “constituent” or “organic” statute which has to provide the
basis for the entire government of a nation over a long period of time. An
inflexible interpretation, rooted in the past, would only serve to withhold
necessary powers from the Parliament or Legislatures’ (above n. 31 at 414); ‘it is
never seriously doubted that progressive interpretation is necessary and desirable
in order to adapt the Constitution to facts that did not exist and could not have
been foreseen at the time when it was written’ (ibid. at 745).
92 Lord Wright, ‘Section 92—A Problem Piece’ (1954) 1 Sydney Law Review 145 at
167: ‘a constitution is meant to operate for a great many years, or even centuries,
and in the course of these years or centuries great changes not only in the
circumstances of the nation may take place, but fresh views of construction,
perhaps largely influenced by practical exigencies, may be raised and debated,
and the fact that for many years a particular solution has been either expressly or
tacitly rejected is not conclusive against its being accepted at some future time
when the matter has been fully agitated’.
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originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, and emphasizes
the need for the Constitution to be interpreted in accordance with
prevailing societal conditions and circumstances.
A common feature of both the Australian and Canadian Constitu-
tions is the difficulty of amendment. In Australia, this requires a
majority of the people in a majority of states, and an overall majority,
to succeed.93 Of 44 proposals put to the people to change the Constitu-
tion, only eight have succeeded. In Canada, domestic amending pro-
cedures did not even feature in the Constitution Act 1867; any
amendments had to be made by the Imperial Parliament; it was only in
1982 that a domestic amending procedure became available.
It is a lot to expect of any document that it remain relevant and
appropriate to a society and world completely transformed from the
original circumstances in which it was written. Authors94 have written
of the major challenges facing Canada, including the building of its
economy with a coast to coast flow rather than the north–south flow,
and a changing conception of the role of government, in particular
the rise of the social welfare state in the twentieth century. It is gener-
ally thought to be impractical for a provincial government to be the
main provider of a social welfare network, given their limited
revenue-raising ability and management capacity in relation to such
programmes. Arguably, social welfare should not differ across differ-
ent regions within the same nation, a point reinforced by the wording
of s. 36(1) of the Constitution Act 1982. Further strains on the existing
federal model were caused by the requirement to finance the effort
involved in World War II; more recently, the global financial crisis has
created similar difficulties.95
A partial solution to the problems caused by relatively static con-
stitutions as the fundamental document of nations whose needs and
challenges constantly evolve has thus been provided by the spending
power of the federal government. The waxing of the spending power
has occurred as the demands of a modern welfare state evolved, and
93 S. 128, Commonwealth Constitution.
94 See. e.g. Macdonald, above n. 78 at 277–80; Andrew Petter ‘The Myth of the
Federal Spending Power Revisited’ (2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 163 at 169: ‘It is
fanciful to think that a document crafted to address the conditions of the 19th
century can, without modification, meet those of the 21st century’; and Choudhry,
above n. 78 at 379: ‘This comparison between a constitution negotiated in the
mid-19th century and one negotiated at the end of the 20th century highlights the
enormous gap between what we need our constitution to do and what its written
text says’.
95 In similar vein, Roderick MacDonald writes of the economic difficulties associated
with World War II, concluding that ‘the federal government found itself politically
unable to raise the revenue needed to finance the war in the absence of provincial
co-operation. On both the spending and taxation fronts, the arrangements of 1867
appeared to be inadequate to deal with these two crises’: above n. 78 at 279.
Thomas Courchene claims that ‘the Information Age has led to a situation where
the policy areas that are in the national interest tend to fall within provincial
jurisdiction’: ‘Reflections on the Federal Spending Power: Practices, Principles,
Perspectives’ (2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 75 at 116.
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the list of areas over which many believe a uniform, or more uniform
approach, is required, has increased. As a result of the spending
power, federal governments have been able to exercise influence and
power over areas not assigned to them by the Constitution. Examples
in Canada include the provision of old-age benefits and unemploy-
ment benefits, and in Australia include federal government spending
in health and education.
It is argued then that one of the ways in which the fundamental
changes in society and the economy that have occurred in the coun-
tries studied has been accommodated in the context of nations with
constitutions that are very difficult to amend has been the ‘fluidity’
provided by the federal government’s access to a broad spending
power to act in areas where citizens legitimately expect a national
response, but where the federal government has no direct legislative
power in terms of the constitution.
ii. Functions Within a Federal System
It is often argued that it is only a national government that can pursue
the most pressing economic functions within a federal system, in
particular some kind of redistributive function, including a system of
social welfare,96 as well as responding to major economic challenges
of the kind the world has been faced with recently. The classic eco-
nomic theory of federalism developed by Wallace Oates was that
macroeconomic management and redistributive functions were best
handled by the federal government.97 This remains the orthodox eco-
nomic position.98
(a) Redistribution Function
Fenna describes the ‘centralising forces on the expenditure side with
demand for redistributive social programs financed from progressive
taxation’.99 Kent talks about use of the (federal) spending power being
essential to Canadian federation ‘otherwise many necessary public
services could not be equably and efficiently provided’.100
As Saunders puts it:
It is in relation to social welfare that the constitutional limitations on the
general spending power are most likely to come into conflict with the
philosophical aims of altruistic federal governments and the practical-
ities of efficient administration. In the first place there is a widespread,
96 S. 51(23A), Constitution, provides the Commonwealth with some legislative power
in this area, but it does not include all welfare programmes.
97 Oates, above n. 2.
98 Warren, above n. 2.
99 Fenna, above n. 15 at 514.
100 Tom Kent, ‘The Federal Spending Power is now Chiefly for People, not Provinces’
(2008) 34 Queen’s Law Journal 413.
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although by no means universal, feeling that the right to benefit from
such major welfare schemes as invalid, old age, widows and orphan
pensions, maternity and child endowment and social insurance should
be uniform throughout Australia . . . Further, most welfare programmes
are expensive, far beyond the capacity of poorer States to implement
and now, possibly, beyond the capacity of any State. Inevitably therefore
they must be funded by the Commonwealth by one means or another. In
Australia, the choice lies between funding by way of grants to the
States, or directly to respective beneficiaries. The choice is likely to fall
upon direct funding, for both practical and political reasons. Spending
by way of conditional grants to the States may be a rational choice in
such areas as roads or housing, where State administrations with the
necessary experience and technique are in existence already. The same
rationale does not apply to the same extent to social welfare partly
because technical expertise in administration is less important, and
partly because most programmes of this nature initiated by the Com-
monwealth are new. Consequently it may be preferable to establish the
necessary administration at federal level rather than to burden the
States with an administration of a programme with which they are ill
equipped to deal.101
Commenting on the Canadian situation, MacDonald writes that:
When Canadians and their governments felt the need to create the
institutions and programs of what became the welfare state, few prov-
inces had the tax base, the population and the governance capacity to
manage them.102
Interestingly, the acceptance of the ability of the federal government
to redistribute income from one part of the federal system to another,
including to address the unequal impact of its own taxation and ex-
penditure arrangements on provincial governments, and to offset
inter-unit spillovers of taxes and expenditure benefits of one state to
another, is also described as an indicator of the continued viability of
a federal system.103
Kong argues that ‘it is generally accepted that a vertical fiscal gap
between the federal and provincial governments is necessary to facil-
itate the pursuit of redistributive objectives within a federation’.104
A sub-national government is limited in its ability to carry out
redistributive functions, including the provision of welfare, because
wealthier citizens may move out of jurisdictions that pursue redis-
tributive activities, and some poorer citizens may move into jurisdic-
tions that pursue redistributive activities. This system may lead to the
101 Saunders, above n. 36 at 398.
102 Macdonald, above n. 78 at 280; see also Choudhry, above n. 78 at 379.
103 R. Dikshit, The Political Geography of Federation (Macmillan: India, 1975) 234–40.
104 Kong, above n. 30 at 350.
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underprovision of the welfare that would otherwise be provided in a
national system.105
In summary then, the position is that a federal government in fed-
eral systems needs to have access to a broad spending power in order
to carry out the kinds of redistributive activities that economists tend
to suggest must practically be carried out at a federal level.
(b) Stabilization Function/Economic Functions Within a Federal
System
Here again, the orthodox economic position is that it is the national
government that should be responsible for broad management of the
economy, including fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate
policy. The level of government spending directly affects each of these
policies.106 While this is generally not in dispute, it is not reflected in
the constitutions studied.107 None of them confers direct108 power on
the federal government in respect of economic issues, again a product
of the very different circumstances in which these documents were
conceived, as compared with the realities of life today. Recent con-
firmation of the federal government’s stabilization function occurred,
somewhat ironically, in the High Court of Australia’s Pape decision,
where a majority of the court was satisfied that only the federal gov-
ernment had the capacity to respond to the challenges posed by the
global financial crisis.
105 C. Brown and W. Oates, ‘Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System’ (1987) 32
Journal of Public Economics 307; J.K. Brueckner, ‘Welfare Reform and Interstate
Welfare Competition: Theory and Evidence’ (1998) Urban Institute—Assessing the
New Federalism Occasional Paper No 21; ‘the empirical findings suggest that
states do act as if welfare migration was common’, leading states to under-
provide, or attempt to discriminate against those coming from a different state:
Joumard and Kongsrud, above n. 8.
106 Briefly, government spending affects the government’s budgetary position (fiscal
policy), to the extent that levels of government spending increase economic
activity and possibly inflation, government spending can influence monetary
policy, since a key objective of monetary policy is to control inflation. The
exchange rate of a country is influenced by many factors, including that country’s
interest rates (monetary policy), and demand for that country’s currency, which in
turn depends on that country’s general economic performance (which can be
influenced by government spending). This is admittedly a very brief summary of
much more detailed literature. More detail can be found at Wallace Oates, ‘The
Theory of Public Finance in a Federal System’ (1968) 1 Canadian Journal of
Economics 37; Oates, above n. 2 at 32–3; Wallace Oates, ‘The New Federalism: An
Economist’s View’, in Studies in Fiscal Federalism (Elgar: Northampton, MA, 1991)
93; A. Breton and A. Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States (ANU
Press: Canberra, 1978).
107 More modern constitutions do address economic management; for example the
South African Constitution of the mid-1990s gives the federal government direct
power over ‘economic development’.
108 Each of them confer a power to the federal government in respect of trade and
commerce (s. 51(1) of the Australian Constitution, s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act
1867 and Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The Canadian and
Australian Constitutions also confer power to the federal government in respect
of corporations.
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The High Court of Australia has sometimes been impressed with
economic arguments in its interpretation of the Australian Constitu-
tion.109 In the recent Betfair110 decision, the court noted:
There have been significant developments in the last twenty years in the
Australian legal and economic milieu in which s. 92 operates.111
Later, the court noted:
The creation and fostering of national markets would further the plan of
the Constitution for the creation of a new federal nation and would be
expressive of national unity.112
Similarly, in interpreting the Commonwealth’s exclusive constitutional
power over certain kinds of taxation, the High Court of Australia has
interpreted the power broadly, with the effect of narrowing the tax
base available to sub-national governments. Members of the High
Court have expressly done so in order to give the Commonwealth
broad control over the taxation of commodities so that the execution
of their chosen tax policy is not thwarted by state action.113 Former
Chief Justice Mason noted how the Australian economy had changed
radically since the 1890s, from a series of loosely connected, small
economies to a melding into one national economy where logistical
barriers between local economies have dissolved with improvements
in communication and transport.114
Jurists in the United States have similarly noted the implications of
unity in terms of economic management, and why sub-national
governments cannot be relied upon to pursue stabilization functions
within a federal system. Professor Tribe states that sub-national gov-
ernments exist in order to protect and promote the interests of their
109 The author believes that economic arguments are relevant in interpreting the
Constitution.
110 Betfair Pty Ltd v WA (2008) 234 CLR 418.
111 Ibid. at 452.
112 Ibid.
113 Dixon J in Parton v Milk Board (Victoria) (1949) 80 CLR 229 at 260; supported by
Barwick CJ in Western Australia v Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd (1970) 121 CLR
1 at 17, who stated the wide view of s. 90 was consistent with the control of the
national economy as a unity which knew no state boundaries, by a legislature
without direct national control over the economy; Mason J in Hematite Petroleum
Pty Ltd v Victoria (1983) 151 CLR 599 (together with Deane J) and Philip Morris
Ltd v Commissioner of Business Franchises (1989) 167 CLR 399. In Ha v New
South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 a majority of the High Court accepted this
broad view of s. 90 for economic reasons (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow and
Kirby JJ).
114 ‘The Australian Constitution 1901–1988’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 752;
Sir Anthony Mason ‘Towards 2001—Minimalism, Monarchism or Metamorphism’
(1995) 21 Monash University Law Review 1 at 11: ‘with the advent of rapid
transportation and communication and the development of modern technology,
trade within each State has become inextricably connected with interstate and
overseas trade. And the nationalisation of the economy has necessarily expanded
the concept of interstate trade to embrace activities and transactions that
formerly had local significance only’.
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own constituents, and they will (understandably) do this at the ex-
pense of citizens of other states.115 Cardozo J noted:
The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philo-
sophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.116
Pushaw notes that:
The United States has been transformed from predominantly self-
sufficient households in agrarian communities (i.e. not engaged in inter-
state commerce) to an integrated national economy based on
commercial agriculture, manufacturing and service. And Congress and
the Court cannot help but respond to such changes.117
The point then is that the federal government in a federal system must
have access to a broad spending power in order to manage a modern
economy. Economists generally recognize the need for the federal
government to carry out stabilization functions or economic manage-
ment within a federal system. Its spending power is an important tool
in this regard.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the following points can be made:
(a) federal governments in federal systems need broad spending
powers in order to carry out (at least) the stabilization and
redistributive functions that the orthodox economic view in this
area suggest can be carried out most effectively by a national
rather than sub-national government;
(b) a broad spending power to the federal government provides a
counterweight to the trend of vertical fiscal imbalance that
115 American Constitutional Law, 3rd edn, Vol. 1 (Foundation Press: New York, 2000),
1051–2.
116 Baldwin v GAF Seelig Inc 294 US 511 at 523 (1935).
117 ‘Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis’ (2003)
55 Arkansas Law Review 1185 at 1210; R. Friedman, ‘before the Civil War, many
Americans had greater allegiance to their state than to their nation, but that is
true no longer. Now the lines have expanded . . . Most Americans expect their
national government to be a muscular one, capable of addressing problems of
broad impact’: ‘The Sometimes Bumpy Stream of Commerce Clause Doctrine’
(2003) 55 Arkansas Law Review 981 at 1006. The United States’ commerce clause
jurisprudence is an important example of the Supreme Court’s use of economics
in assisting its interpretation of the Constitution. See for example J. Kallenbach,
Federal Co-Operation With the States Under the Commerce Clause (University of
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1968); B. Cushman, ‘Formalism and Realism in
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence’ (2000) 67 University of Chicago Law Review
1089 at 1101: ‘as the national economy became increasingly integrated in the
years following the Civil War, the court began a conscious and increasingly
aggressive campaign to break down local barriers to interstate trade through a
free-trade construction of the dormant Commerce Clause’; Richard Collins,
‘Economic Union as a Constitutional Value’ (1988) 63 New York University Law
Review 43.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
38
tends to develop in federal systems, with it being most pro-
nounced in the Australian federal system;
(c) the text of the constitutions studied are all difficult to formally
amend;
(d) this presents challenges when the society and economy for
which the constitutions studied seek to provide a framework
has changed as substantially as it has over time;
(e) the ability of federal governments to resort to a spending power
to manage activities that many now argue needs to occur at a
national rather than sub-national level has provided the neces-
sary ‘fluidity’ in constitutional arrangements, given the difficulty
of formal amendment.
As a result, courts in the nations studied must continue to uphold a
broad interpretation of the federal government’s spending power.
This is less of a problem in the United States, where the clause has
generally been given a broad interpretation by the Supreme Court
with few difficulties as a result. It is more pressing in Canada, and a
non-obiter decision confirming the existence of the federal spending
power from the Supreme Court would be welcome. In Australia, it is
most pressing, particularly with the most recent High Court pro-
nouncement in Pape appearing to deny that the federal government
has a general spending power, and forcing the federal government, at
least in theory, to justify how every appropriation fits within the broad
concept of an activity ‘peculiarly adapted to the government of a
nation’.
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